

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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NFAC #4551-81/1 23 July 1981

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
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH :	National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM :	Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT :	Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. 2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 21 July 1981 with the A/NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you.	

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from Attachment.

Attachment

NFAC #4551-81

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*

NIGERIA

The recent violence in Kano in northern Nigeria and the ongoing border dispute with Cameroon are illustrative of the kinds of difficult problems with which President Shagari must cope as he moves Nigeria along the path of civilian rule. The violence and widespread property destruction that took place in this northern city is not new on the Nigerian scene and can easily be overblown given Nigeria's violent past. Shagari seems to have defused the incident, but further such incidents, coupled with labor unrest and economic problems, could severely test him. He is seen by some as less assertive than previous governments, and the opposition parties as well as others within his ruling party will be watching him closely as they jockey for position and assess his leadership as the government moves toward the 1983 national elections.

In some respects, Shagari is a prisoner of past rhetoric that overdramatizes Nigeria's role as an African leader. Shagari must move carefully to resolve the border dispute with Cameroon in terms that are acceptable in Nigeria and maintain the country's image as a regional power. A military blunder on the border could create problems within the military, who have highly inflated opinions of the army's capabilities, and they could lash out at the president. Thus far, President Ahidjo of Cameroon seems to be playing the dispute in a low key hoping that conciliation is possible through diplomacy.

If further violence along the border breaks out, it could create problems for the French who have a mutual defense agreement with Cameroon. The French have been keeping a low profile throughout the dispute.

MOZAMBIQUE

There is a consensus among Community analysts that over the past year the South African-backed National Resistance Movement (NRM) has developed into a serious threat to the Machel regime. The NRM, with important arms and advisory support from the South Africans, is gradually expanding its insurgency throughout central Mozambique. The Mozambican military, even with Soviet advisory assistance, has been unable to cope effectively with the insurgent groups. It is unclear how much popular support the NRM has attracted from Mozambicans who are unhappy with the Machel regime, but the

*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review <u>possible</u> developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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insurgency has gathered momentum that is likely to continue whether the local nonulace helps the insurgents or merely chooses to stand on the sidelines. Given the absence of clear insights into the highest levels of the Mozambique leadership, Community analysts are unable to assess the impact of the NRM activity on Machel, but generally agree that pressure on him is growing. Rumors apparently are circulating in Maputo that considerable infighting is taking place within the cabinet concerning how the problem is to be dealt with. We know that Mozambique has asked Zimbabwe and Tanzania for assistance--neither has much to offer--and the Soviets are offering military assistance along with economic assistance in the form of grain shipments. principal concern at the warning meeting was that Machel may have little choice but to accept Soviet help even though he reportedly turned down a Soviet offer recently. We could see Machel appeal directly to the US to pressure the South Africans to restrain the NRM. More likely, Machel will ask his Frontline colleagues to press the US on his behalf if he decides he must approach the US. Machel may now ponder more seriously than he has to date whether he will have to clamp down on ANC activity in Mozambique as a condition for the South Africans to rein in the NRM. There is no guarantee Pretoria would respond favorably to an approach from Machel at this time since the NRM is an important part of the present aggressive military policy the Botha government is carrying out against South Africa's black neighbors. CHAD The political implications for Chad and its neighbors of the French announcement that the arms embargo on the Libyans is being lifted are unclear. The Mitterrand government's simultaneous effort to move closer to Goukouni by reestablishing a diplomatic presence in Chad and providing Goukouni with economic assistance suggests the French are exploring ways to help the beleaguered Chadian leader and search for a political solution to the Chadian problem that will lead to a reduced Libyan presence. Until French intentions are more clearly spelled out, Community analysts felt that working with Goukouni--whose position is very weak--is not a viable policy and that the Libyan position in Chad will not change in the near future. It is also unclear how the French move toward Libva will affect Sudanese and Egyptian support to Habre in his thus far unsuccessful military campaign

against Libyan forces in Chad. It seems unlikely that Sadat would cease supporting Habre since such a development would work against his ally, President Nimeiri. Nimeiri would likewise wish to continue support to Habre as one way of keeping the Libyans from meddling in Sudan. Nevertheless, given Libya's strong showing at the Nairobi OAU summit, both leaders may be concerned whether they should continue to be closely identified with Habre.

ZAMBIA AND ZAIRE

Analysts remain uneasy about the internal situations in both countries. In strict economic terms, the Zambian economy has ground to a halt. The government cannot meet its short-term debts, and there is a severe shortage of Approved For Release 2007/04/19 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000300050045-4
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basic commodities. The current wildcat strikes by miners in the Copperbelt are indicative of popular dissatisfaction with the Kaunda government. Concern was expressed over continuing reports of Soviet involvement with anti-Mobutu rebel groups and the Community's difficulty in confirming or denying them.

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